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EvidenceCorner | Hearsay

In-court identifications
not hearsay, are admissible
By Cynthia Ford
Sworn witness, in court, subject to jury observation and
cross-examination:
A: “I was there, I saw him run out of the liquor
store with a gun in his hand.”
Q: “Can you identify the person you saw?”
A: “Yes, he is right over there (pointing), wearing
the orange jumpsuit.”
This is not hearsay, because of the first requirement of the
hearsay definition in 801. This is not an out-of-court statement.
The fact that it is an in-court statement means that the hearsay
rule does not apply. The dangers of hearsay do not exist: the
witness is sworn, the jury can observe the witness as she testifies
and use that observation to help decide if she is telling the
truth, and opposing counsel has the opportunity to test the
identification through cross-examination, ““greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth.”1 Because the in-court
identification is not hearsay, and it is based on the witness’
personal knowledge, Rule 802 does not apply and the testimony
is admissible.

Out-of-court identifications look like, smell like,
hearsay, but are also admissible as non-hearsay
As we have seen in earlier installments, Rule 801(d) operates
as an exception not to the hearsay rule (802), but to the hearsay
definition of 801(c). M.R.E. 801(c) provides that “Hearsay is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.” M.R.E. 801(d) is entitled “Statements which
are not hearsay.” The statements it lists are all made out-ofcourt and are offered to prove the truth of the matter they assert.
Nonetheless, 801(d)’s magic wand transforms them from clear
hearsay to clear non-hearsay and thus beyond the reach of Rule
802. Rule 801(d)(1) lists three types of prior statements, made
out-of-court, by people who later come to court as witnesses,2
which are not hearsay even when offered for the truth of the
1 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1367, at 32
(James H. Chabourn ed., Little Brown 1974). See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 316 (1974) (“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”)
2 I have previously discussed the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements
(801(d)(1)(a)) and prior consistent statements (801(d)(1)(b)) in the two previous issues of Montana Lawyer.
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matter.
The last of these prior statements by witnesses is M.R.E.
801(d)(1)(C):
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is … (C) one of identification
of a person made after perceiving the person.
(Emphasis added).
The Montana Commission Comment to this subsection
indicates that, different from the variation between the Montana
and federal versions of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the Montana language
of (C) is identical to the then-existing version of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)
(C). 3 The Commission gave three reasons for this exception to
the hearsay definition, quoting both McCormick and the federal
Advisory Committee:
There is substantial authority for the admissibility
of these statements, “often without recognition of
the presence of a hearsay problem”. McCormick,
Handbook on the Law of Evidence 603 (2d ed.
1972). The reasons for admitting these types of
statements are first, “the generally unsatisfactory and
inconclusive nature of courtroom identification ... ”;
second, the higher reliability of prior identifications
“made at an earlier time under less suggestive
conditions” (Advisory Committee’s Note, supra
56 F.R.D. at 296); and third, questions as to the
reliability of identifications are really concerned with
constitutional issues and not a hearsay problem. Id.
The Commission also noted that there were only two
Montana cases dealing with the admissibility of out-of-court
identifications, and stated that “neither is on point.”

Montana Caselaw before MRE 801(d)(1)(C)
The two cases cited by the Commission are State v. Fisher,
54 Mont. 211, 215, 169 P 282 (1917), and State v. McSloy, 127
Mont. 265, 273, 261 P2d 263 (1953). In both, there were pretrial
identifications which were recounted at trial, over objection, and
the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility of the
IDENTIFICATIONS, next page
3 The current language of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) is still similar:
“(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to
cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: … (C) identifies a
person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.”
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identifications on appeal.
State v. Fisher was a murder case, in which the two
defendants were convicted and sentenced to death for a Butte
murder during a “hold-up.” The victim, Higgins, was taken
to a hospital and lived several weeks before succumbing to
septicemia. The police brought the two defendants to his bedside
twice, once on the day after the shooting and again a few days
later. The first time, Higgins identified O’Neill, one of the men
in custody, as the man who shot him (he was not sure about
the other man). The Supreme Court opinion reproduces the
colloquy between accused and accuser which followed the
identification:
O’Neill responded: “Brother, look here; this is a
very serious proposition; be careful, you know, and
be sure.”
Higgins rejoined:“I am quite sure; it was either
you or your ghost.”
The second identification occurred at the hospital
later in the month, a day or two before Higgins died:
Towards the last of September the appellants,
pursuant to a promise made them by the officers,
were again taken before Higgins in the St. James
Hospital. Higgins had been told that the officers did
not wish the appellants inculpated unless they were
the guilty parties; yet upon their presentation Higgins
said to O’Neill:
“You are the man that laid me here in bed; you
are the man that shot me; I am positive of that,” –to
which O’Neill answered:
“This is a very serious proposition; be careful; are
you sure I am the man?”
And Higgins rejoined:
“You are the man.”
State v. Fisher, 169 P. 282, 283 (Mont. 1917).
Higgins died before trial, and thus was not a witness; the police
officers at the two hospital identifications did testify about those
identifications.
On appeal, the defendants contested the admissibility
of Higgins’ out-of-court identifications, arguing that the
prosecution had not laid adequate foundation for a “dying
declaration.”
The Supreme Court upheld the admission of the
identifications, but on grounds different from either
“identification” or “dying declaration:” “The evidence was
admissible as showing the conduct and declarations of Higgins
within the observation of the accused, and their conduct in
relation thereto, all touching a matter vital to the issues in
this case.” State v. Fisher, 169 P. 282, 284 (Mont. 1917). (This
seems to be the “res gestae” or “transaction” trump to a specific
evidentiary objection, which itself is grist for an entire mill and
Page 24

hopefully would not work today). What is important for our
purposes is that the pretrial identification was admissible. Note,
however, that Higgins’ identifications fail the definition of nonhearsay under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) because Higgins did not
testify at trial and was not subject to cross-examination about the
pretrial identifications. Thus, today his identifications would be
hearsay (and, even if a hearsay exception applied, would violate
the defendants’ constitutional right of confrontation).
Similarly, the pretrial identification in State v. McSloy was
admitted and affirmed on appeal. (McSloy later was overruled on
other grounds). The McSloy case involved the rape of a 10 year
old boy by a stranger in Anaconda. The stranger had been in a
car, talking to a boy named Freddie “Sonny” Martz. The victim,
James Connors, knew Sonny and rode his bicycle up to the
driver’s side of the car. The driver asked James if he wanted a job,
which would require driving a bit west of town but would only
take a short time. James agreed and got in the car. The driver
took Jimmy to a secluded spot, tied him up, and raped him.
Jimmy escaped and ran to a nearby home.
McSloy was soon arrested and placed in a lineup. Sonny
Martz was brought in and immediately identified McSloy.
Sonny testified at trial. In the courtroom (so not hearsay), he
identified defendant McSloy as the man who drove Jimmy away.
Sonny also testified that the defendant was the same man he had
identified in the sheriff’s office lineup shortly after the crime.
Defense counsel cross-examined Sonny about the identifications,
and the prosecutor conducted redirect. Then the victim’s father
testified about what he saw when Sonny was confronted with the
lineup and identified McSloy as the perpetrator.
Error is assigned in permitting Pat Connors, the father of
prosecuting witness, to testify as to what he observed when the
witness Martz identified defendant in the sheriff’s office. He
testified: “Mr. Derzay called Sonny Martz into the office where
they placed various men in a line-up around the office-men in
plain clothes, and these men were mostly dressed for the rodeo-it
was about the time of the rodeo here in Anaconda and they were
dressed up in western outfits, plaid shirts, etc., and they asked
Sonny Martz if he saw the man in here that had offered him the
job and the ride, and the boy said, ‘That’s the man,’ and the door
to the office was open a little and Mr. Derzay told Sonny to go
over and touch the man.”
The cases bearing upon this method of proving the
identification of defendant are in conflict but the trend of recent
cases is to admit such evidence.
State v. McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 273-74, 261 P.2d 663, 667
(1953). The Montana court followed the trend it described, and
held the testimony about the pretrial identification admissible:
The court did not err in permitting the witness to
testify as to what he saw and observed regarding the
identification. The only effect of the corroborating
evidence is to show that the prosecuting witness
identified the accused at a time when there had been
no opportunity for the witness to be swayed by any
suggestion of others. Defendant’s counsel was still
privileged to argue to the jury that the witness was
mistaken in the identification, and this is so whether
one or a dozen persons witnessed the identification.
IDENTIFICATIONS, next page
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In other words, the correctness of the identification
still depends upon the accuracy of the recollections of
the one person making the identification.
State v. McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 275, 261 P.2d
663, 668 (1953). The Court supported its admission
of pretrial identifications with an extensive quote:
Mr. Wigmore in his work on Evidence discusses
this question as follows: ‘Ordinarily, when a witness is
asked to identify the assailant, or thief, or other person
who is the subject of his testimony, the witness’ act of
pointing out the accused (or other person), then and
there in the court-room, is of little testimonial force.
After all that has intervened, it would seldom happen
that the witness would not have come to believe in the
person’s identity. The failure to recognize would tell
for the accused; but the affirmative recognition might
mean little against him.
‘The psychology of the situation is practically
the same as when Recent Contrivance is alleged. To
corroborate the witness, therefore, it is entirely proper
(on the principle of § 1129, ante) to prove that at a
former time, when the suggestions of others could not
have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the
witness’ mind, he recognized and declared the present
accused to be the person. If, moreover (as sometimes
is done) the person was then so placed among others
that all probability of suggestion (by seeing him
handcuffed, for example) is still further removed, the
evidence becomes stronger. The typical illustration is
that of the identification of an accused person at the
time of arrest * * *.
‘This is a simple dictate of common sense, and
was never doubted in orthodox practice. That some
modern Courts are on record for rejecting such
evidence is a telling illustration of the power of a
technical rule of thumb to paralyze the judicial nerves
of natural reasoning.’ IV Wigmore on Evidence,
3d ed., § 1130, pp. 208, 210. Many cases are there
cited, some taking the one view and some the other.
In the note on page 214 the author in criticizing an
Oklahoma case excluding such testimony said, ‘Courts
are lamentably blind to the error of this doctrine,
which flies in the face of common experience.’
127 Mont. at 274-75, 261 P.2d at 667-68 (1953).
Thus, before the M.R.E. were promulgated and adopted,
the Montana Supreme Court allowed pretrial identifications
into evidence, whether through the testimony of the identifier
or through the testimony of others who observed the prior
identification. M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) is consistent with this
jurisprudence, but imposes a requirement that the identifier
testify at trial.

Montana Caselaw after MRE 801(d)(1)(C)
The “identification exemption” from the definition of
hearsay is virtually absent from Montana jurisprudence. I
searched Westlaw Next for the term “801(d)(1)(C)” and came
up with 20 cases. However, when I read and analyzed these
cases, I found that none of them actually applied 801(d)(1)(C)
at all. Interestingly, in several of the reported cases a pretrial
identification made by a person who later testified at trial could
have been admitted simply under Rule 801(d)(1)(C), but that
subsection was never discussed in the appellate opinion, and
apparently not at trial either. Using this subsection would have
greatly reduced the difficulties in these cases, at both the trial and
appellate levels. I will discuss the cases in reverse chronological
order.
In the 2001 case of State v. Giant, the victim reported to
both the hospital and police that she had been attacked by her
husband, Giant. Accordingly, the State charged and prosecuted
the husband, relying so heavily on the victim’s identification
that it failed to do any forensic testing of the evidence found at
the home. At trial, though, Mrs. Giant surprisingly testified that
the attacker was not the husband but her eldest son, and that
she purposely misidentified the husband both to protect her son
and to punish her husband. The jury convicted the husband,
although the only evidence of his guilt was the prior identification
(recanted at trial) and the fact that the husband had fled after the
attack. Under Montana law, neither piece of evidence standing
alone could justify the verdict.4 On appeal, the issue was whether
the combination of the two would suffice.
The Montana Supreme Court approached the problem as
one of admissibility of the witness’ prior inconsistent statement,
rather than of identification. The Supreme Court observed
that the rationale for admission of such statements outside the
definition of hearsay was similar to that for the admission of
pretrial identifications:
¶ 18 The original version was initially
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Evidence, Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (Advisory
Committee). Rules of Evidence for United States
4 “We have previously held that a criminal conviction cannot be sustained where
the only evidence of some essential element of the crime is a prior inconsistent
statement. State v. White Water (1981), 194 Mont. 85, 89, 634 P.2d 636, 639; State v.
Gommenginger (1990), 242 Mont. 265, 278, 790 P.2d 455, 463; State v. Jolly (1941),
112 Mont. 352, 355-56, 116 P.2d 686, 687-88 (holding prior inconsistent statement
insufficient for conviction before the current Montana rule was enacted); compare
State v. Fitzpatrick (1980), 186 Mont. 187, 195-98, 606 P.2d 1343, 1348-49 (holding
prior inconsistent statement of witness admissible as substantive evidence); State v.
Woods (1983), 203 Mont. 401, 411-12, 662 P.2d 579, 584.” State v. Giant, 2001 MT 245,
307 Mont. 74, 79-80, 37 P.3d 49, 52-53 overruled by State v. Swann, 2007 MT 126, 337
Mont. 326, 160 P.3d 511.
“Further, we have frequently held that evidence of flight is not sufficient in itself to
prove guilt. State v. Davis, 2000 MT 199, ¶ 41, 300 Mont. 458, ¶ 41, 5 P.3d 547, ¶ 41;
State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 47, 297 Mont. 111, ¶ 47, 991 P.2d 929, ¶ 47; State v. Patton (1996), 280 Mont. 278, 290, 930 P.2d 635, 642; State v. Bonning (1921), 60 Mont.
362, 364-65, 199 P. 274, 275 overruled on other grounds by State v. Campbell (1965),
146 Mont. 251, 263, 405 P.2d 978, 985; State v. Paisley (1907), 36 Mont. 237, 252, 92
P. 566, 571; see also United States v. Flores (5th Cir.1977), 564 F.2d 717, 718-19 (finding flight alone insufficient to infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).” State v. Giant,
2001 MT 245, 307 Mont. 74, 80, 37 P.3d 49, 53 overruled by State v. Swann, 2007 MT
126, 337 Mont. 326, 160 P.3d 511.

IDENTIFICATIONS, next page
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Courts and Magistrates, Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, 56 F.R.D.
183, 293 (1973); Blakey, at 6. This version was
recommended based on the assertion by modern
commentators on evidence that cross examination
during trial was sufficient both to remove prior
inconsistent statements from the definition of
hearsay, and to provide the jury a means to assess the
reliability and trustworthiness of these statements.
WEINSTEIN’S, §§ 801App.01 [4] at 14-18, [5] at
36-36.3 (Advisory Committee’s letter to the Senate
Judiciary Committee and clarification after Rule
801(d)(1)(A) was enacted); Blakey, at 41; 56 F.R.D.
at 295-96. These commentators asserted that this
reasoning was as sound as the rationale behind the
other exclusions and exceptions from the hearsay
rule. WEINSTEIN’S, § 801App.01[4] at 18; compare
Rule 801(d)(1)(C), M.R.Evid., (pretrial identification);
… Finally, the original proposal was also supported
by findings that prior statements made nearer in
time to an incident were more accurate and free from
outside influences. MCCORMICK, § 251, at 116 &
n.12; WEINSTEIN’S, § 801 App.01[4] at 15-16.
¶ 19 The Commission Comments to Montana
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) indicate that Montana relied on the
above rationale behind the original federal proposal
in enacting this State’s rule. The Comments state that
the Commission believed cross examination during
trial was sufficient to remove such statements from
the definition of hearsay and that to require the prior
inconsistent statement be made under trial conditions
would defeat the usefulness of the rule. (Emphasis
added).
State v. Giant, 2001 MT 245, 307 Mont. 74, 81-82, 37 P.3d 49,
54 overruled by State v. Swann, 2007 MT 126, 337 Mont. 326, 160
P.3d 511d. However, the Court never made the direct connection
between 801(d)(1)(C) and the witness’ identification of the
husband as her attacker. If M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) had been used,
it clearly would have allowed evidence that the wife had first
identified the husband, without having to establish that this was
inconsistent with her trial testimony. As always, the proponent
should point out that there are two separate bases for admission
of the contested evidence
wherever possible.
The Montana Supreme Court also decided an “identification”
case in 1996, but again inexplicably made no reference at all
to M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C). Further, the Court wrongly held that
the pretrial identification of the father as “the shooter” by his
daughter, who testified at trial, was inadmissible. State v. Stuit,
277 Mont. 227, 921 P.2d 866 (1996). Stuit was convicted of felony
criminal endangerment. At trial, the investigating police officer
testified that he saw bullet holes in the door jamb leading to the
children’s room. The mother and the daughter told the officer
that the father was the shooter. The father’s defense was that
someone else, who had recently moved from the house,
Page 26

shot the gun.
The mother did not testify at trial, but Shannon, the daughter,
did:
Shannon testified the offense occurred in the
month of December 1992. She further testified that
she was sitting on the couch with her mother and
Stuit when he shot the rifle five times into the wall.
Thus, Shannon testified from personal observation as
to the shooting, the identity of the shooter, and the
approximate date. The admissible testimony from the
officer that there were at least seven bullet holes in
the wall and door jamb, and that from his experience
the five bullet holes in the wall could have been made
from someone sitting on the couch in the living room,
corroborated her testimony. He also testified that he
had recovered a .22 rifle from the bedroom Sharon
and Stuit had shared. From Shannon’s testimony
as to her personal observations and the admissible
corroborating testimony of the officer, the State
established the occurrence of the shooting and the
identity of the shooter.
State v. Stuit, 277 Mont. 227, 232, 921 P.2d 866, 870
(1996)
However, the Court held that that part of the officer’s trial
testimony in which he identified Stuit as the shooter, based on
the identification of Shannon before trial, was inadmissible. The
Supreme Court applied the general definition of hearsay, but
apparently neither counsel nor the Court read any further in
Rule 801 than (c):
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Rule 801(c), M.R.Evid. The police officer’s
testimony at trial as to the identity of the shooter and
the specific date of the offense was admittedly based
on out-of-court statements made to him by Sharon
McLain and her daughter, Shannon. The officer had
no personal knowledge of the alleged incident which
had occurred approximately two weeks prior to his
investigation.
State v. Stuit, 277 Mont. 227, 230-31, 921 P.2d 866, 868-69
(1996). The State apparently conceded that the pretrial statement
of identity was hearsay, and claimed on appeal that Shannon’s
pretrial identification as admissible under an exception to the
hearsay rule, M.R.E. 804(a)(3). The State did not argue at either
level that it was not hearsay at all per 801(d)(1)(C). The Supreme
Court held that the trial judge had erred in admitting the officer’s
testimony as to the identity of the shooter. (It found the error to
be harmless, and affirmed the conviction).
In fact, if the prosecutor and the Supreme Court had correctly
applied M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C), the jury should have been able to
hear both Shannon’s in-court identification of her father and,
from either Shannon herself or the police officer or both, the fact
that on the night of the investigation, Shannon also identified her
father as the shooter.
IDENTIFICATIONS, next page
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The opinion does not contain the verbatim testimony of the
police officer, so perhaps the problem lay in the phrasing of the
question. If the prosecution asked the officer: “Who was the
shooter?” a proper and sustained objection would be either (or
both—they are the flip sides of each other) “Foundation—no
personal knowledge—may I voir dire?” or “Hearsay—may I voir
dire?” However, M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) clearly would allow these
questions from either side: “Did Shannon identify the shooter
on the night you first visited the home?” and “Whom did she
identify then?” Different from 801(d)(1)(A) and (B), it does not
matter whether the identification is consistent or inconsistent
with the testimony at trial. Thus, 801(d)(1)(C) authorizes all
parties to admit pretrial identifications so long as the identifier
does testify at trial.
In State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405, 808 P.2d 453 (1991),
defendant Harris was accused of sexual abuse of two young
children for whom she babysat. One of the witnesses at trial was
a therapist who specialized in sexual abuse patients, and who
had treated both children. The Supreme Court, and presumably
the trial court and lawyers, embarked on a difficult and divisive
analysis of Montana’s hearsay exception for medical diagnosis
and treatment (803(4)) and the residual or catch-all exceptions
found at the end of Rules 803 and 804.
The opinion, again, totally omits any discussion of Rule
801(d)(1)(C), even though the dissent framed one issue as “Did
the District Court err in allowing Ms. Burns [the therapist] to
identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the alleged crimes
by testifying as to hearsay statements made to her by the victims
during the course of therapy?” State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405,
422, 808 P.2d 453, 463 (1991).
The plain language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) answers the
question: if the identifier testifies at trial (as both victims did),
then evidence of pretrial “identification of a person made after
perceiving the person” is not hearsay. There is no need to discuss
the parameters of any specific hearsay exception, or of the
residual exceptions. Ms. Burns should have been able to tell the
jury that the victims had identified to her the person or persons
who had abused them. The majority of the Supreme Court held
just the opposite: “Because Robby was available to identify and
did indeed identify defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, the
hearsay statements to which Burns testified were not the most
probative evidence on the matter. As we noted above, Burns’
testimony on this issue was merely cumulative, serving only to
bolster Robby’s testimony.” State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405, 414,
808 P.2d 453, 458 (1991) (emphasis added). The strong dissent
also failed to apply the clearest and easiest analysis, 801(d)(1)(C).

In contrast to the dearth of Montana cases, there is a
plethora of federal cases interpreting 801(d)(1)(C)
The United States Supreme Court decided the seminal case
on identification as non-hearsay in Owens v. U.S., 484 U.S. 556
(1988). A prison guard was assaulted, resulting in a severe head
injury and memory problems. The FBI visited him twice in the
hospital shortly after the attack. On the first visit, he couldn’t
remember anything about the incident. On the second visit, he
named Owens as the attacker, and then picked him out of an
www.montanabar.org

array of photographs. The victim testified at trial, but said that
he no longer had had any present recollection of the event. He
did remember making the prior identification in the hospital. On
appeal, the 9th Circuit upheld both of the defendant’s challenges
to introduction of the pretrial identification: hearsay and
confrontation.
The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve conflicts in the
circuits on both issues, and concluded that neither the hearsay
rule nor the right of confrontation clause had been violated.
The conviction was affirmed. Discussing F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C),
the Court observed:
This reading seems even more compelling when
the Rule is compared with Rule 804(a)(3), which
defines “[u]navailability as a witness” to include
situations in which a declarant “testifies to a lack
of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s
statement.” Congress plainly was aware of the recurrent evidentiary problem at issue here-witness
forgetfulness of an underlying event-but chose not
to make it an exception to Rule 801(d)(1)(C).
The reasons for that choice are apparent from
the Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 801 and
its legislative history. The premise for Rule 801(d)
(1)(C) was that, given adequate safeguards against
suggestiveness, out-of-court identifications were
generally preferable to courtroom identifications.
Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 801, 28 U.S.C.
App., p. 717. Thus, despite the traditional view
that such statements were hearsay, the Advisory
Committee believed that their use was to be fostered rather than discouraged. Similarly, the House
Report on the Rule noted that since, “[a]s time goes
by, a witness’ memory will fade and his identification will become less reliable,” minimizing the barriers to admission of more contemporaneous identification is fairer to defendants and prevents “cases
falling through because the witness can no longer
recall the identity of the person he saw commit the
crime.” H.R.Rep. No. 94-355, p. 3 (1975). See also
S.Rep. No. 94-199, p. 2 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News, 1975, pp. 1092, 1094. To judge from
the House and Senate Reports, Rule 801(d)(1)(C)
was in part directed to the very problem here at issue: a memory loss that makes it impossible for the
witness to provide an in-court identification or testify about details of the events underlying an earlier
identification.
U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. at 562-63, 108 S.Ct. at 844 (1988).
Thus, the Court held that neither the Confrontation Clause nor
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is violated by admission of an
identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a
memory loss, to testify concerning the basis for the identification.
484 U.S. at 564, 108 S.CT. at 845.
WestlawNext reports 411 federal cases which discuss Owens
and therefore pretrial identifications. (For the purposes of this
article, I have not read all of those cases. Obviously, some of them
IDENTIFICATIONS, next page
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exclude all evidence of the officer’s identification. After a pretrial
hearing, the judge denied the motion and the Supreme Court
affirmed his decision.
are solely about the Confrontation Clause component, while
Lally’s challenge and the Supreme Court decision were both
others focus on the rule.) When the search is changed to find for
based on the Due Process Clause. Neither made any mention
all federal cases discussing 801(d)(1)(C), it brings back 121 cases.
of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C), which clearly would have allowed the
The most recent of these sums up the current federal application:
evidence.
[E]xtrajudicial witness identifications are
¶ 14 A defendant’s constitutional right to due
routinely used as substantive evidence of guilt.”
process bars the admission of evidence deriving from
Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 427 (1st
suggestive identification procedures where there is a
Cir.2009) (citing Samuels v. Mann, 13 F.3d 522,
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
527 (2nd Cir.1993); Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(C).
See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196–98, 93 S.Ct.
Moreover, the fact that neither of the Taits iden375, 380–82, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); State v. Lara,
tified petitioner in court would not render the
179 Mont. 201, 204–05, 587 P.2d 930, 931–32 (1978);
evidence insufficient to convict petitioner. “There
*63 State v. Higley, 190 Mont. 412, 420–21, 621 P.2d
is no requirement, either in the Constitution or in
1043, 1049 (1980); State v. Schoffner, 248 Mont. 260,
the usual rules that apply to the admission of evi265–66, 811 P.2d 548, 552 (1991)….
dence, that a witness who makes an extrajudicial
identification of a criminal defendant must repeat
¶ 15 We apply a two-part test to determine
the identification in the courtroom.” Foxworth,
whether an in-court identification based on a
570 F.3d at 427; See also Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d
pretrial identification is admissible. We first
496, 505–11 (6th Cir.2003) (upholding the admisdetermine whether the pretrial identification
sion of out-of-court statements of a minor victim
procedure was impermissibly suggestive. If it was,
which were admitted under Ohio Evid. R 801(d)
we then determine, based on the totality of the
(1)(C) as a prior identification of petitioner, even
circumstances, whether the suggestive procedure
though victim was unwilling to testify about the
created a substantial likelihood of irreparable
statements at trial and did not remember making
misidentification.
them).
State v. Lally, 2008 MT 452, 348 Mont. 59, 6263, 199 P.3d 818, 821. (The Court ultimately held
Thomas v. Perry, 2013 WL 1747799 (E.D.Mich.
that although the procedure used was possibly too
2013).
suggestive, in the end, it did not “create a substantial
The fact that Montana’s version of 801(d)(1)(C) was
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”) See
specifically adopted verbatim from the F.R.E. version means that
also, State v. Baldwin, 318 Mont. 489, 81 P.3d 488
these federal cases will be very helpful to Montana lawyers and
(2003); State v. DuBray, 317 Mont. 377, 77 P.3d 247
judges who are faced with pretrial identification admissibility
(2003); State v. Rudolph, 238 Mont. 135, 777 P.2d
issues in our state courts.
296 (1989).
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Pretrial Identifications may be unconstitutional, even
if they meet the requirements of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C)
Lots of Montana criminal cases do deal with admissibility
of formal police-sponsored identifications on constitutional,
rather than evidentiary, grounds. The absence of discussion of a
hearsay objection probably indicates that both sides understood
that these identifications are defined as non-hearsay, but counsel
should always consider making raising two grounds rather than
just one, if at all possible. Identifications made by witnesses at
trial are not hearsay, but if the identifier does not testify at trial,
the opponent should object on hearsay as well as constitutional
grounds. U.S. v. Owens, supra, dealt with the Confrontation
Clause; many other cases raise Due Process objections to
government-sponsored identifications.
As an example of the second type of constitutional objection,
in State v. Lally, a police officer who unsuccessfully chased two
vehicles but saw at least one driver was shown photographs of
two suspects, and identified one of them, who was then charged
and tried. The photograph the officer-witness identified was a
mug shot, labeled “Sheriff’s Office, Missoula MT;” the other was
a photo shot in a person’s living room. The defendant moved to
Page 28

These cases are good reminders that trial lawyers cannot
rely solely on the rules of evidence to protect their clients. Even
where the M.R.E. appear to allow a piece of evidence, the federal
and state constitutions may provide a firmer basis for objection.
(In a later piece, I will discuss the most recent U.S. and Montana
Supreme Court cases on the right to confrontation).

Conclusion
Montana’s version of 801(d)(1)(C) mirrors F.R.E. 801(d)
(1)(C), but it does not seem that the Montana rule is used
very often in reported cases. It is a good tool to escape from a
hearsay objection, and thus avoid a protracted excursion into the
numerous hearsay exceptions. By its plain terms, M.R.E. 801(d)
(1)(C) applies in both civil and criminal cases, to both sides in
any case. (There are additional constitutional considerations
when pretrial identifications are used by the prosecution in
criminal cases.) Try using it.
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